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Introduction
The role of the prosecutor is currently undergoing a major shift in a steadily
increasing number of counties across the United States. Until the past five years
or so, prosecutors were generally expected to go after those who commit crime
with relentless zeal, sparing little concern for the scale and harshness of our
carceral system. But this has recently begun to change. Several dozen district
attorneys (“DAs”) who plausibly describe themselves as reformers or, in many
instances, as “progressive prosecutors” have now won elections by promising
to shrink the vast footprint of America’s criminal justice system. That figure by
itself might fail to impress considering that there are over 2300 elected DAs in
the United States.1 The new crop of reform-oriented prosecutors punch above
their weight, however, since many of them hold power in high-density urban
centers like Brooklyn, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston. All told, “about 40
million Americans, more than 12 percent of the population, live[s] in a city or
county with a D.A. who . . . could be considered a reformer” (290).
What should we make of these reformist prosecutors, and how do they fit
within the larger movement to transform American criminal justice? Emily
Bazelon wrestles with these questions in her new book, Charged: The New Movement
to Transform American Prosecution and End Mass Incarceration. Bazelon has reported on
prosecutors and other criminal justice topics for years at The New York Times
Magazine and, previously, Slate; she is also a lecturer in law and the Truman
Capote Fellow at Yale Law School. Through an engaging mix of investigative
journalism centered on two specific prosecutions and incisive analysis of
broader national trends, Bazelon makes the case that American prosecutors
have misused their immense power to punish far too many people much too
harshly and, further, that prosecutors must now exercise that same power
differently to help reverse mass incarceration. Even more ambitiously, Bazelon
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argues that electing prosecutors who are serious about decarceration represents
“the most promising means of reform . . . on the political landscape”(296).
Charged is an important, insightful book. To be clear, I am not entirely
convinced by the strongest version of Bazelon’s thesis: namely, that
prosecutorial power is the main culprit behind mass incarceration as well as
our best hope for escaping from it. It seems to me that other stakeholders
besides prosecutors—legislatures, courts, police, defendants and their lawyers,
community leaders, and more—also have key roles to play, both as a general
matter and in the two prosecutions that Bazelon puts under the microscope.
But the abundant discretionary power wielded by prosecutors unquestionably
matters a great deal. Charged invites much-needed reflection on how prosecutors
should exercise that power through its trenchant critique of conventional
prosecutors and its rich exploration of their reformist brethren.
Conventional Prosecutors, Mass Criminalization, and the
Case Against Noura Jackson
It is not hard to see why Bazelon is alarmed at the scale and harshness of
the American criminal justice system. Although the U.S. incarceration rate was
comparable to that of most European countries a half-century ago, the United
States is now “home to 5 percent of the world’s population but 25 percent of
its prisoners.”2 The United States incarcerates nearly 2.3 million people on
any given day, with approximately 11 million new admissions to jail or prison
every year,3 disrupting—oftentimes, totally derailing—a vast number of lives.
Another 4.5 million or so adults are subject to community supervision, mainly
probation or parole, which means there are around 6.7 million adults, or one
out of thirty-seven, who are currently under some type of correctional control.4
Even this startling figure is utterly dwarfed by the number of people in the
United States who have been arrested or convicted at some point in their lives.
People of color are especially at risk: Black adults are incarcerated at nearly
5.9 times the rate of white adults,5 and approximately one out of three black
men (or nearly 1 in 4 black adults overall) bears the stigma of a felony criminal
record.6
How did the American criminal justice system become so enormous and
punitive? Many different factors contributed, and there remains a great deal
2.

John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes
Achieve Real Reform 1 (2017).
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Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarceration: The
Whole Pie 2019 (2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports.
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Alexi Jones, Prison Policy Initiative, Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and
Supervision by State (2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports.
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E. Ann Carson, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2016, at 8 (2018), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf. Hispanic adults are incarcerated at a rate around
3.1 times that of white adults—a somewhat lower yet still quite dramatic disparity. Id.
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of disagreement over which of them carries the most explanatory weight.
One of Bazelon’s central claims in Charged is that the “breathtaking power”
of prosecutors is the “missing piece” that helps explain not only the rise of
mass incarceration, but also the related problems of wrongful convictions
and racially disparate enforcement outcomes (xxv). Bazelon endeavors to
support this claim in part by documenting the troubled history of a murder
prosecution against a young woman named Noura Jackson, and by identifying
generalizable lessons from Noura’s tale along the way.7
Noura was eighteen years old and had recently lost her father when her
mother, Jennifer Jackson, was brutally murdered. Noura and Jennifer were
living together at the time, and it was Noura who first discovered Jennifer’s
body and called 911. Although Noura told the police that she had been out all
night partying before the murder, Amy Weirich, the Shelby County prosecutor
assigned to the case, suspected Noura had killed Jennifer for money and to
liberate herself from her mother’s rules.
No physical evidence tied Noura to the crime, but several strands of
circumstantial evidence initially lent at least a modicum of plausibility to
Weirich’s theory. Noura and Jennifer had quarreled intensely over money, drug
use, and schoolwork during the days leading up to Jennifer’s killing. Noura’s
alibi was not airtight, and her story shifted somewhat over time.8 Also, a friend
of Noura’s named Andrew Hammack claimed that Noura had contacted him
multiple times on the morning Jennifer was killed asking him to meet at her
house—an unusual request for Noura to make, and one that placed Noura at
home around the time when the murder occurred. (More about Hammack in
a moment.) Weirich charged Noura with first-degree murder and sought a life
sentence.
Despite all this, however, there were profound reasons to doubt that Weirich
had charged the right person from the very beginning.9 And the case against
Noura grew weaker still when DNA testing conducted by the Tennessee crime
7.

I will follow Bazelon’s convention of referring to Noura and Kevin—the defendant in
Bazelon’s other main case study—by their first names. Bazelon refers to Kevin solely by
his pseudonymous first name, and using Noura’s first name makes it easier to distinguish
between her and her mother, who shares her last name.

8.

No one doubted that Noura told the truth about the first part of the evening: Noura’s
friends confirmed that she had been out partying with them. And phone records established
that Noura had spoken with Jennifer at 12:20 a.m., placing the time of the murder between
12:20 and Noura’s 5 a.m. call to 911. Regarding that stretch of time, Noura told police that
she had visited “a friend’s house, a gas station, and Taco Bell,” leaving out the fact that
she had also gone to Walgreens around 4 a.m. to buy bandages for a small cut on one of
her hands (14-15). By contrast, when Noura’s aunt Cindy asked where she had been that
night, Noura simply replied, “I don’t know”—an answer that Cindy, Weirich, and others
considered incriminating (15, 113).

9.

There was no known history of violence between Noura and Jennifer, and the pristine
condition of Noura’s manicure when she spoke with the police shortly after Jennifer’s death
made it unlikely that she was the person who had physically struggled with Jennifer and
stabbed her fifty times.
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lab revealed that at least two unknown individuals—but not Noura—had left
behind DNA mixed with Jennifer’s blood inside the room where the murder
took place.10 Yet this did not deter Weirich. She extended a plea offer under
which Noura would spend twenty-five years in prison. Noura turned down the
offer, went to trial, was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, and was
sentenced to prison for nearly twenty-one years.11
Weirich and her junior colleague, Stephen Jones, committed serious
misconduct in at least two ways during Noura’s trial. First, Weirich illegally
drew the jury’s attention to Noura’s decision not to testify by shouting—right
at the start of her rebuttal argument—“[j]ust tell us where you were!,” then
adding, “That’s all we’re asking, Noura!” (118).12 Second, the prosecutors failed
to disclose, until five days after trial, a handwritten note that key government
witness Hammack had given the police indicating, among other things, that
he’d been “rolling on XTC” (referring to Ecstasy, a hallucinogenic drug) on
the morning of the incident (120). The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded
that these errors deprived Noura of a fair trial, warranting reversal of her
conviction.
No one has ever held Weirich and Jones meaningfully accountable for
their misdeeds. In fact, during the years that followed Noura’s trial, Weirich
leveraged her “reputation for being ‘tough as nails’” to win election as the top
prosecutor of Shelby County (181). For his part, Jones went on to become
Weirich’s legal adviser and training director. The Tennessee bar disciplinary
authorities did file ethics charges against Weirich and Jones based on their
mishandling of Noura’s trial. But Jones was found not guilty by a threemember panel of fellow lawyers from the local bar—a panel that included a
former Shelby County prosecutor—and bar counsel subsequently let Weirich
walk away with no consequences to speak of beyond a private reprimand.
As for Noura, a special prosecutor took over her case after Weirich
voluntarily recused herself from further involvement. The special prosecutor
offered Noura an Alford plea13—set to expire after one day—to voluntary
manslaughter with a sentence of fifteen years in prison and with parole
eligibility after Noura served sixty percent of the sentence. Because Noura had
10.

Although long blond hairs were found in Jennifer’s hand, the government inexplicably did
not test those hairs for DNA. Nor did the government test a condom wrapper found on the
floor of Jennifer’s bedroom, apparently because the investigators decided to fingerprint the
wrapper, and “the process used to lift the fingerprint made a DNA test impossible.” State v.
Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 575 (Tenn. 2014).

11.

The jury acquitted Noura, however, of the top charge: first-degree premeditated murder
(583).

12.

Simply reciting Weirich’s words understates the gravity of her misconduct. Around the time
she demanded that Noura tell the courtroom where she had been, Weirich was “striding
across the courtroom to where Noura was sitting, bending her knees to look her in the eye,
and throwing up her hands in a gesture of impatience” (118).

13.

An Alford plea allows a defendant to maintain his or her innocence while formally assenting
to an agreed-upon conviction and sentence for tactical reasons. The U.S. Supreme Court
approved this kind of plea in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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already been imprisoned for around nine years by this time, the agreement
meant she would likely be released in the not-so-distant future. Recognizing
that she might get convicted again and receive a sentence harsher than fifteen
years if she gambled on a second trial, Noura took the deal. Noura has now
completed her sentence and is hard at work trying to get her life back on track
outside the prison walls.
Bazelon sees Noura’s prosecution as a microcosm of broader systemic
pathologies—and for good reason. She analyzes Weirich’s fateful decision
to indict Noura without a solid evidentiary foundation not only as a lapse
of personal judgment but as the product of an institutional culture that
“prizes aggression and trial victories” over “[c]aution” and “balance” (19). She
explains that the suppression of exculpatory evidence at Noura’s trial is likely
symptomatic of a widespread problem in jurisdictions that have not yet moved
toward open-file discovery and, instead, rely on prosecutors to decide for
themselves what evidence is sufficiently important to share with the defense.
And she criticizes prosecutors who use their vast discretion over charging and
plea bargaining to coerce defendants into pleading guilty, citing the intense
pressure Noura’s prosecutors applied as an instance of this pervasive practice.
That said, Noura’s case, like any complex story, has some idiosyncratic
features that limit the range of lessons we might draw from it. Noura was able to
pay for effective legal representation, take her case to trial (the first time around,
anyway), and obtain reversal of her conviction on appeal. Countless other
defendants, by contrast, receive tokenistic representation from overworked,
underpaid attorneys and get pushed into unfavorable plea agreements before
anyone—defense counsel, prosecutor, judge, or jury—meaningfully scrutinizes
the allegations. Noura is middle-class and white,14 whereas the criminal
justice system far more commonly targets poor people and people of color.
And although Noura probably did not do what prosecutors alleged she had
done, the same cannot be said of most criminal defendants. Reversing mass
criminalization will require not just avoiding wrongful convictions in the
narrow sense of convicting the wrong person, but drastically reducing our
reliance on carceral responses and excessive punishment for people who did
engage in prohibited conduct.
Reformist Prosecutors, Diversion, and the Noncriminal
Disposition of Gun Charges against “Kevin”
Although Charged comes down hard on prosecutors like Amy Weirich who
misuse their discretion to put too many people behind bars for too long,
Bazelon does not condemn prosecutorial power as such. Her thesis, rather,
is that prosecutors can and must use the levers they control in a fresh new
way, aiming to downsize America’s swollen prisons, jails, and other carceral
14.

It is worth mentioning, though, that Noura “had her [Lebanese] father’s dark hair and eyes
and an olive complexion,” and she felt as though her aunts—including Cindy, who was one
of the prosecution’s key witnesses at Noura’s trial—“wanted nothing to do with [her father]
or the daughter who looked like him” (9).
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institutions while also promoting public safety. She contends that electing
reform-oriented prosecutors offers the best hope, at least in the short term, for
reversing mass incarceration and transforming how Americans think about
criminal punishment and security.
To build this pillar of her argument, Bazelon traces the arc of a gun
prosecution brought by the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, under the
leadership of a self-described progressive prosecutor named Eric Gonzalez,
against a young man referred to by the pseudonym “Kevin.” Bazelon applauds
Gonzalez for supporting an unusually adventurous diversion program—
one designed for (some) felony gun possession offenses, not just low-level
misdemeanor offenses—and celebrates that Kevin was able to avoid prison
time by participating in the program. But as Bazelon acknowledges, even in
Brooklyn, with a prosecutor interested in reform at the helm, the story could
easily have ended differently—indeed, it very nearly did end differently—with
Kevin getting torn from his community to serve several years in an upstate
prison. Kevin’s eventual success, viewed in tandem with the multitude of
barriers and near-failures he encountered along the way, highlight the promise
and value of prosecution-driven criminal justice reform as well as its limits.
Kevin’s story is set in Brownsville, “one of New York’s most disadvantaged
communities . . . and one of its most dangerous” (xiv). As a black boy
growing up there, Kevin could not escape the violence that was endemic in his
community: At the age of thirteen he was beaten and robbed by residents of
a rival public housing project, and when he was fifteen someone cut his face
with a razor blade. These experiences taught Kevin that “he couldn’t afford
to look like an easy target,” so he and his friends beat up one of the boys who
had attacked him (xvi). Over the next few years, Kevin struggled in school,
eventually dropping out entirely, and he began to accumulate a record of
juvenile offenses.15
One evening, Kevin, then twenty years old, was hanging out in his friend
Chris’s home when police officers arrived, searching for a gun with which
Chris had posed in a video posted on social media.16 In a bid to protect Chris
and other friends who were there, Kevin picked up the gun and tried to
conceal it from the police. But his plan failed: The police spotted him with the
gun. Feeling “bound by loyalty and a kind of honor,” Kevin claimed the gun
belonged to him (xx).
Kevin’s arrest thrust him into the thicket of New York City’s fraught politics
around gun possession. Brooklyn had two longstanding diversion programs
15.

Kevin was first arrested when he was sixteen. A friend of Kevin’s lent him a car, but as luck
would have it, the car had been stolen. He was charged with possession of stolen property
and was ordered to perform 500 hours of community service. Two years later, Kevin and his
friends got into another fight with boys from a different project, and after the other boys
dropped their phones while fleeing, Kevin kept the phones. He pleaded guilty to robbery
and took advantage of a year-long diversion program for youthful offenders (xvi-xvii).

16.

The police suspected that Chris was tied to a gang, so they were monitoring his social media
activity and took notice when he uploaded the video (xix).
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for gun offenders—Youth and Congregations in Partnership, or YCP, and
Project Redirect—and there was a chance Kevin might be a suitable candidate
for at least YCP.17 Ken Thompson, who preceded Gonzalez as Brooklyn’s
DA, had argued that diverting certain gun cases “is in the best interest of
public safety in the long run,” explaining, “if we don’t, they’re going to go to
prison for a few years at a young age, and they’re going to come out and pose
more of a problem for us in the community” (55-6). Gonzalez also backed the
programs, and he took steps to expand them after taking over as head of the
office. But the police had been trying to shutter YCP and Project Redirect
for years, capitalizing on negative publicity from the rare cases in which a
defendant who benefited from diversion went on to commit a serious new
offense. For Gonzalez as well as the line prosecutors who handled day-to-day
business in Brooklyn’s gun court, “every YCP participant represented a risk,”
and so the office screened and accepted just a small subset of the defendants
who wound up in gun court (31).
The prosecutors responsible for Kevin’s case initially adopted an aggressive
stance, angling to maximize their leverage in plea negotiations. They charged
Kevin with the highest possible offense—a felony carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty of three and a half years in prison plus parole—instead of
a lesser felony option requiring at least two years in prison plus parole or a
misdemeanor with no mandatory minimum. They asked for bail to be set
at $20,000; the judge acquiesced.18 And they offered Kevin a tough, albeit
routine, plea: two years in prison followed by parole.
Kevin’s court-appointed lawyer from the Brooklyn Defender Services,
Debora Silberman, lobbied the prosecutors to let Kevin participate in YCP.
At first, her efforts to divert Kevin from the criminal justice track led nowhere.
But Silberman continued to press the issue, while simultaneously litigating
a motion to suppress Kevin’s incriminating statements to the police19 and
connecting Kevin with a social worker who was also employed by Brooklyn
Defenders. The judge granted Silberman’s suppression motion, modestly
weakening the prosecution’s case against Kevin. For his part, Kevin attended
GED classes and stayed out of trouble. After about a year, the prosecutors
relented, agreeing to at least refer Kevin to YCP for screening.
YCP is a strict program, operated directly by the DA’s office,20 that imposes
a number of conditions and burdens on its clients. Clients must call in for a
17.

Bazelon does not discuss whether Kevin pursued or may have been eligible for Project
Redirect.

18.

As a result, Kevin’s impoverished mother had to pay a nonrefundable $2000 deposit plus
fees to a for-profit bail agent to keep Kevin out of the notoriously violent Rikers Island jail
while his case was pending.

19.

In the motion, Silberman claimed that the police violated the Constitution by asking Kevin
and his friends, “Whose gun is this?,” after arresting them but before administering Miranda
warnings (25).

20.

Most diversion programs, by contrast, are run by outside partners rather than the DA’s office
itself, making it easier for support staff to build trust with clients.
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nightly curfew and “submit to random drug testing, do community service,
check in with a YCP social worker in person every week, and work or go
to school” (123). The social workers ask participants questions about “their
neighborhoods and networks,” and while their answers are supposedly kept
confidential, many clients “suspected they were being pumped for information
that could be fed to the police or the D.A.’s office,” placing them at risk of being
labeled a snitch in their communities (124-5). A new arrest can get someone
kicked out of the program. Clients who clear the screening phase are required
to plead guilty if they wish to move forward. Their convictions eventually get
dismissed and sealed if they successfully complete YCP’s year-long program,
but those who fail go to prison in accordance with the terms of their plea.
Kevin struggled with many of YCP’s requirements. From the very beginning,
he refused to tell his social worker about his friends or about people in the
community who had guns, since he “had little trust that a program run by
the D.A.’s office would keep his secrets” (125). One of his many court dates
coincided with a sentencing hearing for a man who came from a rival housing
project; Kevin skipped court, explaining to his social worker that the man’s
supporters would be there, potentially jeopardizing his safety.21 Just a few
weeks after Kevin passed screening, gained entry into YCP, and pleaded guilty,
the police arrested him on a flimsy loitering charge, causing him to violate
the terms of his plea agreement.22 He also took a drug test that falsely tested
positive for marijuana—an error Kevin’s social worker was able to straighten
out by redoing the test himself. And Kevin waited until the eleventh hour to
complete eighty hours of community service, fulfilling his last YCP obligation.
In the end, Kevin successfully completed YCP, earning the dismissal of
his conviction.23 To that extent, at least, Bazelon is on solid ground when
she lifts up Kevin’s experience to “illustrate . . . the precious second chances
[prosecutors] can extend that allow people to make things right in their own
lives” (xxix). She is also undoubtedly right that Brooklyn’s gun court “offered
a display of enormous prosecutorial power” insofar as prosecutors there have
broad discretion to pursue a serious felony charge, a lesser misdemeanor
charge, diversion, or dismissal (xxiii).
21.

Another court date was set for the same day Kevin was supposed to take his GED test, which
could not be rescheduled. Instead of missing court again, he quit school.

22.

Kevin was outside one night before his curfew, smoking a cigarette while watching people
play dice, when a police car quickly pulled up. Those who were playing dice, some of whom
had been smoking marijuana, fled, but Kevin stayed put and was arrested. Luckily for Kevin,
a glitch prevented the prosecutors from learning immediately about the new arrest, and his
YCP social worker later framed the incident in a manner that helped calm the prosecutors’
nerves.

23.

This is not to say Kevin had completely put the case behind him. A few months after
Kevin graduated from YCP, the police came to the home he shared with his mother, sister,
and niece, broke down the front door, handcuffed him, and tore apart every room in the
apartment, searching for guns that an informant had accused Kevin of keeping there. The
police mentioned Kevin’s gun charge, even though his case had supposedly been sealed,
and his inclusion on a list of high-priority targets maintained by the police department.
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To my mind, though, the way Kevin’s case was handled by Brooklyn’s
prosecutors raises troubling questions regarding the limits of prosecutiondriven criminal justice reform. For starters, why was Kevin’s conduct
criminalized and prosecuted at all? Perhaps prosecutors claiming the mantle
of reform should stop pushing gun possession defendants into programs like
YCP that severely restrict their liberty and set some of them up to fail, and
should instead go several steps further, dismissing cases outright and leaning
on the legislature to decriminalize or decrease the mandatory penalties for
unlawful gun possession. Also, why are prosecutors who work for a progressive
like Gonzalez using harsh felony charges as bargaining chips to extract
cheap guilty pleas and demanding $20,000 bail—or any bail—from a young
man living in poverty? Shouldn’t Gonzalez and his staff instead rely on their
sense of justice, not a desire for leverage, when making charging decisions,
and strive to reduce or even eliminate New York’s wealth-based pretrial
detention scheme?24 Finally, what should we make of the fact that Gonzalez’s
prosecutors initially opposed diversion for Kevin and changed their tune only
after a skillful defense lawyer—aided by a social worker and, of course, Kevin’s
own efforts—pressed the issue for months and a judge handed them a major
defeat on a pretrial motion? It seems that prosecutorial discretion, though
undoubtedly expansive, is not impervious to pressure from outside forces and
that even prosecutors led by a reformer need such pressure to stay on track.
Principles and Best Practices for Reform-Minded Prosecutors
Electing reform-minded prosecutors as a means of drastically downsizing
the carceral state is a fairly novel concept, and no one can truly know at
this early stage how the experiment will turn out. District attorneys who
campaigned on a promise of far-reaching reform are now test-running a wide
range of decarceral strategies, learning through trial and error which ones most
effectively drive down incarceration without causing crime spikes or needless
backlash. In this rapidly evolving political environment, there is a pressing
need for reflective work aimed at identifying principles and best practices to
guide reformist prosecutors and the community stakeholders who hold them
accountable.
On this score, Charged does not disappoint. Bazelon periodically zooms out
from narrating the particulars of Noura’s and Kevin’s criminal cases to provide
a broader examination of the nascent movement to elect prosecutors who
demonstrate a commitment to deep reform. She describes the movement’s
brief yet fascinating history, identifies its common goals as well as its salient
internal variations, and explores the challenges it has encountered so far. And
the book ends with a remarkable appendix titled Twenty-One Principles for TwentyFirst-Century Prosecutors: a manifesto that Bazelon coauthored with other leaders
in the field.
24.

Soon after coming to power in Brooklyn, Gonzalez instructed prosecutors not to seek bail
“in most misdemeanor cases” (92). But the policy did not cover felony gun charges such as
the top charge Kevin was facing.
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Bazelon traces the origins of the movement for prosecution-driven criminal
justice reform to 2015.25 That year, billionaire philanthropist George Soros
partnered with death penalty abolitionists to launch three campaigns, two in
Mississippi and one in Louisiana, to unseat district attorneys who frequently
sought death sentences. Once those campaigns succeeded, emboldened
reform leaders carefully selected another set of targets, chief among them Anita
Alvarez, the top prosecutor in Cook County (which covers Chicago). Former
prosecutor Kim Foxx defeated Alvarez by a landslide in the Democratic
primary, all but ensuring victory in the general election, by tapping into the
community’s outrage over the notorious police shooting of Laquan McDonald,
which Alvarez woefully mishandled. Foxx’s win in Chicago inspired dozens of
other insurgent candidacies across the country. Not all of them prevailed. But
many did: Bazelon estimates that “about 40 million Americans, more than 12
percent of the population, live[s] in a city or county with a D.A. who . . . could
be considered a reformer” (290).
These newly elected prosecutors are bound together by a few core
commitments. Their overarching goals, to borrow from Gonzalez, are to
“protect public safety” while simultaneously being “far less punitive” (272).
They believe mass incarceration has not only decimated poor communities
and communities of color, but has also fueled serious crime by diminishing
trust in (and cooperation with) the police and by subjecting vast numbers of
people to inhumane, anti-rehabilitative punishments. They are not, of course,
abolitionists—after all, reformist prosecutors are still prosecutors. But they
hope to see a major reduction in prosecutions and criminal penalties for lowlevel criminal offenses, a redirection of scarce enforcement resources toward
solving violent crimes, and fairer procedures used to pursue cases that remain
on the prosecution track.
Prosecutors seeking to implement bold reform initiatives frequently run
into fierce resistance. The most intense pushback often comes from the local
police, who are accustomed to working hand in glove with their prosecutorial
partners and tend to feel betrayed when prosecutors align themselves with
criminal justice reformers instead of (or in addition to) their law enforcement
brethren.26 Some reformist prosecutors have faced crippling blowback not just
from the police, but from governors, legislatures, judges, and other officials
25.

Bazelon says that before 2015 there were a few “partial exceptions to harsh law-and-order
prosecution,” citing as examples the “long-serving D.A.s” in Seattle and Milwaukee, as well
as Kamala Harris in San Francisco (80). Perhaps a sign of how quickly national norms
regarding prosecution have shifted over the past few years, Harris’s record as a prosecutor,
which had been a major asset in her previous campaigns for higher office, suddenly turned
into a liability during her failed 2020 presidential bid. See Peter Beinart, Progressives Have Short
Memories, The Atlantic, Dec. 4, 2019.

26.

When former public defender and civil rights lawyer Larry Krasner won Philadelphia’s
prosecutor race, for instance, city officers widely disseminated the hashtag #notmyDA, and
the leader of the police union condemned one of Krasner’s first speeches as “dangerous and
despicable” (161).
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too.27 And the new wave of prosecutors must also grapple with the quiet yet
insidious risk of opposition from within: the risk, in other words, that line
prosecutors or supervising prosecutors will ignore reformist aspirations
and carry on with business as usual when making high-stakes, low-visibility
decisions about charging, bail, plea offers, sentencing, and more.
Should district attorneys who are interested in reform fight fire with fire?
Or should they compromise and seek buy-in from stakeholders who may have
more conventional, punitive instincts about the function of law enforcement?
Bazelon probes these questions by comparing Gonzalez’s leadership style
in Brooklyn with that of Larry Krasner in Philadelphia. Gonzalez is a career
prosecutor who prefers working collaboratively with the police as well as other
state and city officials to build a shared vision of criminal justice. While running
for office on a moderately reformist agenda, he cultivated relationships with
the police and other establishment figures, securing endorsements from the
police union, Brooklyn’s congressional delegation, and more. Since winning
election, Gonzalez has continued to work in coordination with his staff and
other law enforcement officials to pursue reform in a gradual manner. Krasner,
on the other hand, is a former public defender and civil rights lawyer who had
sued the city police department seventy-five times before seeking office. He
saw the city’s criminal justice system as racist and profoundly destructive, and
he didn’t hesitate to say so. Soon after gaining power, Krasner fired thirtyone prosecutors,28 put in new leadership, and issued a memo instructing his
attorneys to dismiss, divert, or recommend lenient sentences in many cases
involving nonviolent offenses. Bazelon does not tell us whose approach to
leadership and collaboration she favors, but she seems to suggest that the
answer may vary depending on the prosecutor’s local political environment
and the scale of the reforms that are needed in his or her jurisdiction.
Bazelon shows her cards more readily when discussing the substance of the
reform agenda rather than the leadership strategies used to effectuate it. An
appendix to the book reprints a report Bazelon had previously coauthored
with Miriam Krinsky (Fair and Just Prosecution), L.B. Eisen (Brennan Center
for Justice), and Jake Sussman (the Justice Collaborative), laying out twentyone principles to guide prosecutorial reform and fleshing out each principle
with concrete policy recommendations and model initiatives drawn from
jurisdictions all across the country. The document covers a lot of important
ground, urging expanded use of diversion, fairer charging and sentencing,
27.

As an example, Florida Governor Rick Scott stripped control of murder prosecutions away
from Orlando DA Aramis Ayala after she announced that she would not seek the death
penalty under any circumstances. Florida’s Supreme Court upheld the governor’s action,
and the state legislature slashed Ayala’s budget to reflect her reduced caseload. Because of
this exceedingly unusual intrusion on her jurisdiction, Ayala is not pursuing reelection in
2020. See Monivette Cordeiro & Jeff Weiner, Aramis Ayala Won’t Seek Re-election as Orange-Osceola
State Attorney; Belvin Perry May Enter Race, Orlando Sentinel, May 28, 2019.

28.

Krasner infamously explained the firings this way: “When the pirates take over the ship,
some of the crew is going over the side” (161).
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abolition of cash bail, efforts to reduce racial disparity, enhanced police
accountability for excessive force incidents, and much more.
Many of the ideas Bazelon and her coauthors champion could be
implemented unilaterally by prosecutors, given the immense discretionary
power they hold over so many of the criminal justice system’s key levers.29 This
tantalizing possibility, perhaps more than anything else, helps explain why
Bazelon is so enthusiastic about prosecutor-driven reform. “While it would
be nice if lawmakers and the courts threw themselves into fixing the criminal
justice system, in the meantime, elections for prosecutors represent a shortcut
to addressing a lot of dysfunction,” she writes (272).
I am broadly sympathetic to Bazelon’s project.30 At the same time, I worry
that reform efforts that place prosecutors at the center are, and likely will
remain, insufficiently bold and imaginative to dig us out of the deep hole
we currently find ourselves in. Prosecutors depend for their success on close
working relationships with the police and other fixtures of the carceral state,
and they can push the system only so far without straining those relationships.
Many of the deeper layers of reform we need to pursue—such as decriminalizing
(not just diverting) most low-level offenses and rethinking the severity of our
carceral responses even for serious or violent offenses—call for leadership from
outside the system. Bazelon is absolutely right that we need better prosecutors.
But we must also be wary of overinvesting in prosecutor-driven reform at the
expense of legislative and community-based sources of power and vision.

29.

This assumes, of course, that the elected district attorney and his or her line prosecutors are
on more or less the same page. As noted earlier, that assumption does not always hold.

30.

See Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious Professional Ethic for
Prosecutors, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1541 (2012) (arguing that line prosecutors and prosecutors’
offices can contribute to racial justice by altering how they exercise discretion).

